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NOTES ON CONTRACT PROBLEMS AND
COMPARATIVE LAW*
MALCOLM P. SHARPt
OUR major problems stand first in the list of contract problems
ready for study, and perhaps ultimately action, in the light of com-
parative law. These are the problems of consideration; mistake and
impossibility; the power of a possessor to transfer title to tangible things
or contract rights; and specific performance. Many other questions, of
course, suggest themselves, such as the defenses of a surety, the protec-
tion of a mortgagor, the effect of non-disclosure on a fiduciary's trans-
actions, and the development of contractual rules in the field occupied by
technical rules of conveyancing.
I
The doctrine of consideration has, of course, been the subject of elabo-
rate historical and critical study on the part of students and lawyers. If
a man simply promises a favorite or particularly needy relative a gift
to help him in some work, and then suddenly dies, it may become the
duty of his executor or administrator to resist the claim of the promisee;
and the abolition of the common law force of the seal in many jurisdic-
tions makes it impossible to make a promise of the sort which shall be
binding. If a man seriously promises, even in writing, to keep an offer
open for a stipulated time, and the offeree makes elaborate arrangements
on the faith of the promise, the offeree cannot nevertheless on that ground
insist that the offerer keep his word. If a maker's friend or associate in-
* This memorandum grows out of a course in the comparative law of contracts conducted
last spring by Professor Max Rheinstein, with the cooperation of the writer. These notes were
prepared as part of an informal exchange of preliminary suggestions between Professor Rhein-
stein, Mr. Kurt Borchardt, and the writer, in preparation for our work in assembling material
for the further study of contract problems in the light of comparative law. The memorandum
is, of course, an entirely tentative outline of problems for study, and it is published partly in
the hope of securing criticisms and suggestions.
Morris R. Cohen's The Basis of Contract, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 553 (1933) and F. C. Sharp's
The Ethics of Breach of Contract, 45 int. J. Ethics 27 (934) have furnished some of the philo-
sophical foundation for these notes. The influence of Dean Pound's lectures will be apparent
at various points.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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dorses his note after its delivery to a lending bank and after a loan has
been made on the note, for the sake of improving the maker's credit, he
cannot nevertheless be relied on by the bank; though if his own note, even
fraudulently procured, had been transferred by the borrower merely as
security for an antecedent debt, the lender would normally be treated as
a holder in due course and entitled to recover accordingly. These are
a few of the examples of the questionable justice of rules of the common
law which differ from the rules of law applicable to comparable situations
in countries whose law has developed from Roman law origins.
The process is familiar by which limitations on the enforcement of
simple promises have been removed in the development of the law of
continental Europe. The influence of the church and the natural law
philosophy in removing limitations of this sort has been particularly
emphasized. It is, of course, also to be remembered that the Roman law
system did not fill some important commercial needs which began to in-
fluence the law in the Middle Ages. Professor Holdsworth's treatment of
the history of the bill of exchange is particularly suggestive on this point,
and is a reminder that the transactions effected by means of a bill of ex-
change, even before its negotiation, occasioned even more difficulty for
continental lawyers than for English lawyers.
It is to be observed that the medieval English common law contained
ideas which, developed logically, would lead to more satisfactory results, in
some respects, than the modern common law has achieved. The charac-
teristic formal promise of the common law, the sealed writing, may origi-
nally have embodied simply the view that written instruments, properly
signed and seriously intended, may create obligations; certainly the aboli-
tion of the common law effect of the seal seems to leave defective the law
of many American jurisdictions. The real obligations of the common law
enforced in the actions of account, debt, and detinue, seem to have con-
tained the germs of a development which would have covered at least as
wide a field as the real and consensual obligations of the Roman law. The
treatment of agency and partnership problems in the action of account,
and the treatment of sales by a combination of debt and detinue, are ex-
amples of the capacity for progress shown by these actions.
It may be, however, that the idea expressed in these actions has
had a limiting effect on the growth of the idea which has created most of
the modern law of contract. The promisee who has relied on the represen-
tations supposed to be implied in a promise, and who has performed or
even promised to perform to his detriment, is the victim of the tort which
came to be remedied in assumpsit. The theories of debt and assumpsit
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are, of course, distinct. The surety in the later law is thought of as re-
ceiving no quid pro quo, but his obligee may have relied on him to the
obligee's detriment; while the promisee for whom another has furnished
consideration does not look at all like the victim of a tort and should not
on principle recover in assumpsit, though the early cases in account and
debt indicate that those remedies should have been available to him.
Quid pro quo and consideration may thus supplement each other. On the
other hand, the idea that a consideration must be bargained for, apparent-
ly related to the idea of quid pro quo, is an obstacle to the logical develop-
ment of the idea implicit in assumpsit that a recovery should be available
to anyone who has, in any selected sense, been hurt by the promise of
another and his failure to fulfill it.
The history of Roman law countries and the outline of the medieval
common law thus suggest that modern lawyers should consider the desir-
ability of further development in the common law of contract, whether
by legislation or decision, or both. There are indeed, as is well known,
many indications that the common law of consideration is undergoing a
transformation more or less gradual. In the field of gratuitous promises,
charitable subscriptions have been enforced in various circumstances by
the application of more or less satisfactory reasons. The students of con-
tract and the students of conveyancing will not agree on the reason, but a
promise to convey land, followed by possession and lasting improvements
by the promisee, is specifically enforced in equity.
In matters less clearly involving gifts, and particularly in some com-
mercial matters, there are striking instances of the enforcement of prom-
ises not supported by consideration. A few jurisdictions have treated re-
ceipts, particularly written receipts, as operative to effect the discharge
of a greater sum on the payment of a smaller.' In the case of another
type of promises affecting causes of action, the rules are much better es-
tablished and even more striking. One may not only "waive" a defense in
advance in many situations, but he may even "waive" a defense after it
has arisen, as, for example, the rather questionable defense of a surety
based on the extension of time to his principal.
Lord Mansfield's efforts to introduce moral consideration had, of course,
only very limited success; but some promises of those protected by in-
fancy, bankruptcy, and the Statute of Limitations are enforcible, as well
as the promise of one for whom something has previously been done at
his request. A curious development of an idea a little like that applied in
I See 17 Iowa L. Rev. 102 (193I). Cf. Ferry v. Stephens, 66 N.Y. 321 (1876).
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Coggs v. Bernard,2 and generally regarded as anomalous, seems to be taking
place today. Thus a gratuitous bailee who failed to insure as he promised,
and a mortgagee who by a mistake in his application failed to secure effec-
tive insurance for his mortgagor, have been held liable in New York. 3
Even more strikingly, a real estate agent who gratuitously promised to
bid for property for his principal has been held liable to the principal on
the dubious ground, apparently, that his opportunity to earn a commis-
sion is consideration for his promise to bid. 4 In their discussion of under-
taking and hurtful reliance, the opinions in these cases are a reminder of
the close relationship between tort and contract. The decisions suggest a
development comparable to the history of assumpsit. With the subscrip-
tion agreements, the promises to convey followed by improvements, and
some of the instances of "waiver," they perhaps indicate that the idea of
promissory estoppel is likely, as the Restatement indicates,5 to be more
generally applied by the decisions of the courts.
A number of commercial influences are doubtless producing similar
phenomena in various branches of the law. Thus, a pre-incorporation
subscription for stock can frequently be regarded as nothing more than an
offer to a corporation when formed; and yet in many jurisdictions the offer
binds the subscriber on incorporation, without either acceptance by or
consideration from the corporation. The result, perhaps, depends on stat-
ute.6 Again, though directors cannot ordinarily be forced to declare divi-
dends, even if earned, a public declaration of a dividend creates an en-
forcible right in the stockholders; and the best explanation seems again
to be based on promissory estoppel.7
Familiar modifications of the ordinary law of contract are to be found
in the law of bills and notes, which comes, of course, from the continent.
The presumption of consideration is perhaps a trace of the continental
origin of this body of law. The rule that a bill or note may be given to re-
lease a debt of larger amount in England, or of equal amount in the United
States, while explained on various grounds by the judges, seems funda-
2 1 Salk. 26 (1703).
3 Siegel v. Spear, 234 N.Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414 (1923); Barile v. Wright, 256 N.Y. 1, 175 N.E.
35I (I93I).
4 Kirby v. Brown, 229 App. Div. 155, 241 N.Y.S. 255 (1930); reversed on other grounds in
255 N.Y. 274, 174 N.E. 652 (i93i). For an interesting discussion of these and related cases,
see 45 Harv. L. Rev. 164 (193r).
5 Restatement, Contracts § 90 (1932). See also the cases in which promises in the nature
of offers are treated as enforcible on what seem substantially similar grounds. Id., §§ 27, 45.
6 See Page, Contracts § 541 (2d ed. 1920). See also 6r A.L.R. 1463 (1929).
7 See 28 Mich. L. Rev. 914 (1930); 39 Yale L. J. r163 (1930).
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mentally inconsistent with the supposed requirement that obligations
created by a bill or note must be supported by consideration. Even in
England, an acceptor may of course be bound to a payee, even though
the payee has not furnished the consideration for his obligation. Com-
mercial objections to relieving one who has indorsed after delivery and
extension of credit, have led to decisions based on the theory of conditional
delivery, where in fact it is very hard to find conditional delivery. Finally,
the well-known rule that an obligation created by a negotiable instrument
may be voluntarily renounced in writing results from a decision frankly
applying continental ideas.8
Other examples of tendencies to depart from the strict requirements of
consideration have been referred to by various students. The effect of a
stipulation in open court is another familiar example of an obligation en-
forcible without consideration. The instances listed seem the most sig-
nificant of best established examples of what may be an increasing tend-
ency to depart from the common-law standard of consideration. It is per-
haps worth noting that the problem of determining whether a state has
undertaken an obligation which will be protected by the contract clause
of the constitution may have to be solved without resort to the test of
consideration. 9
It may thus be useful to consider changes which can be expected reason-
ably soon in the doctrines of consideration. The Uniform Written Obliga-
tions Act is a suggestion for legislation. It may be that the experience of
European lawyers in developing legislation determining the conditions
under which promises are enforcible, could be usefully combined with
Anglo-American experience, to produce a somewhat more elaborate stat-
ute, which would deal more adequately with the variety of cases to which
it must apply, and commend itself more to lawyers imbued with Anglo-
American traditions. Such a statute would of course deal separately with
gratuitous promises. It would perhaps deal separately with promissory
estoppel, perhaps enacting in terms the rules of the Restatement. It would
presumably recognize that in a great number of commercial transactions
a serious written promise should be enforcible.
It would go a long way in the direction of putting into effect the rule
8 See Campbell, Cases on Bills and Notes 416-44o, 736-739 (1928).
9 Wisconsin Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903). See also Newton v. Comm'rs., 1oo
U.S. 548 (i879); Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U.S. 231 (i899); Williams v. Wingo, 177 U.S. 6or
(igoo); Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, i8o U.S. 624 (xgoi); American Smelting Co. v.
Colorado, 204 U.S. 103 (1907); R. R. Comm. v. Eastern Texas Ry., 264 U.S. 79 (1924);
Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U.S. 50 (1926); Fort Smith Lighting Co. v. Paving
District, 274 U.S. 387 (1927); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931).
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frequently stated by the Athenian orators: "Whatever one willingly
agrees upon with another shall be sufficient." While it may be that the
formula represents a formal Greek promise, the statement is so sensible in
terms that it seems well worth remembering.o
II
Modification or abolition of the doctrine of consideration would thus
make it possible for a promisor voluntarily to confer upon another an
asset in the form of a contract right, whose deliberate or negligent or
faultless violation may be actionable, and subject to the familiar rules of
contract damages. One might voluntarily undertake a risk, and give his
promisee a kind of insurance. Since consideration of fault did not begin to
be important in the law of torts until the seventeenth century, it is not
surprising that comparable considerations have developed only partially
in the law of contracts. It seems only consistent, however, with the de-
velopment in torts, that negligent or faultless mistake of fact should de-
velop significance in the law of contracts. It would not be surprising, in-
deed, to find that one whose foresight was confused by any substantial
mistake of fact, even as the result of negligence, is liable at most for ex-
penses occasioned his promisee as the result of his undertaking and failure
to make it good.
The Anglo-American law, like other bodies of law, has, of course, not
developed consistently to any such point. In cases of mutual mistake, a
variety of tests for relief have been attempted; and the one which seems
to be getting general acceptance represents, perhaps, some improvement
over the Roman law test. The rule that relief will be granted for mistake
as to an essential characteristic of a person, thing, or transaction, while it
may be applied to reach sound results, seems open to some objection. Is a
mistake as to the nature of soil a mistake as to an essential quality of a
thing? If so, do the classifications in treatises on soils control the courts?
Can the question be determined at all by physical considerations? Must
not the "subjective" mental states of the parties have considerable
weight? If "subjective" states are dealt with by a concept of assumption
of risk, does not the consideration of essential qualities become subordi-
nate, and at best, of slight help in the application of some other controlling
principle? Much the same difficulties can be raised with efforts to dis-
tinguish between mistakes as to "extrinsic" and "intrinsic," or "collater-
al" and "material" facts. In some situations the application of such tests
would, if taken seriously, result in improper relief for mistake; while in
zo See Weiss, Griechisches Privatrecht 431-433 (1923).
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other cases, for example cases of mistake about the assets behind secu-
rities, such tests might unduly limit relief.
Accordingly, the "fundamental assumption" test seems to be gaining
favor among American students and courts. The chief objection to this
test is, of course, that it is simply a vague set of terms by which the results
of a kind of administrative justice can be labeled. It seems possible, how-
ever, to give the test sufficient content so that it will be useful as a guide
or standard in the ordinary work of the courts. Thus, where the parties
to a transaction think of a fact as humanly certain, that is, possessing
very high probability, and as a result make their transaction; and it is
impossible to suppose that they were taking the risk of circumstances
turning out otherwise, the mistake, if prejudicial, will be a defense to a
contract action or suit, or a ground for affirmative relief. Because of in-
terests in promised advantages, property, the security of transactions and
acquisitions; in recognition of conditions of trade, and the understanding
of businessmen; and with a view to consistency with the perhaps debat-
able fundamental elements of our theory of "objective" consent and con-
tract damages, parties will be treated as taking the risk of all circum-
stances as to which their position seems doubtful to the trier of the mixed
question of fact and law presented. For a mutual mistake, both parties
must make the same assumption and perhaps recognize that it controls
their conduct.
The development of such a test would perhaps represent an improve-
ment over the rather special treatment of different kinds of mistake found
in some bodies of European law. It should perhaps be supplemented by
special rules as to mistake of expression. Peculiar considerations perhaps
apply, further, to mistake in situations not complicated by the existence
of transactions which would normally be recognized as effective by courts,
such as mistakes resulting from the activities of supposed agents and mis-
takes in the performance of contracts. In these cases the security of trans-
actions is not seriously in question, and relief should therefore be more
readily granted.- It may be, however, that the suggested test and prin-
ciple cover all these situations adequately.
The Anglo-American law of mistake could perhaps most profitably be
improved by the addition of foreign elements in dealing with unilateral
mistake, mistake of law, and the apportionment of losses resulting from
mistake.
While relief for unilateral mistake of expression seems likely to be given
" Cf. however, Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762); Fidelity Co. v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis.
304, 227 N.W. 387 (1929).
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increasingly, relief for unilateral mistake of other sorts is not in favor with
either writers or courts. It seems not unlikely that the situation is partly
the result of the concentration of attention on unilateral mistakes of cal-
culation in the bids of contractors. Relief for mistake of this sort is not
given in Germany, where relief for unilateral mistake of other sorts is
common. The result is due to the wording of the German Code in its
treatment of mistake as to essential qualities. It seems, however, that the
result may arguably be justified on a principle which should apply in
any system in which relief for unilateral mistake is granted. It may be
that a contractor must ordinarily assume the risk of the accuracy of his
figures. The American opinions dealing with this situation may be thus
for the most part sound. On the other hand, their discussion of unilateral
mistake perhaps goes beyond the necessities of the cases, and it seems in-
consistent with the principle on which relief for mistake of any sort is
granted.
The principle may perhaps be stated somewhat in this way. Where
mistake is recognized as a defense to an executory contract, a "subjec-
tive" element appears in the law of contracts. An obligee who can secure
the return of his consideration or its equivalent and has not, except by
furnishing the consideration changed his position, is not "wronged" by
the mistaken obligor's refusal to perform. Indeed, as has been observed,
damages for the consequences of fault in contracting should perhaps
logically be the limit of recovery in any case against an obligor who is neg-
ligently or faultlessly mistaken. A strong interest in the security of trans-
actions, and as well, perhaps, a metaphorical development of substance
or thing concepts of contract, are perhaps the explanation of the familiar
rules of contract damages. A negligently mistaken obligor who deliberate-
- ly refuses to perform seems much like the negligent author of a misrepre-
sentation who deliberately refuses to make good. The limits of the lia-
bility of such a person have, of course, been much discussed.
In the case of mistake in an executed transaction, since failure to per-
form would not have been a wrong, objections based on the security of
transactions fail, and affirmative reasons for relief appear. In such cases,
and in cases where mistake appears apart from contract, the controlling
interests seem analogous to individual interests of property and general
interests in the security of acquisitions. Comparable considerations occur
in cases of negotiorum gestio; here, however, these interests to prevail must
be combined with other interests, in the Anglo-American law. In cases
where property has been transferred by mistake, the individual interests
of property and the general interests in security of acquisitions themselves
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appear in a clear light, operating to create a rule protecting the original
owner from something like the "loss" of things against a "finder" who
"wrongfully," without justification, insists on the uncompensated reten-
tion of "accidentally acquired" (not "deliberately given") benefits, to the
original owner's hurt.12 As has just been suggested, a closely comparable
set of considerations applies to the cases where services have been ren-
dered, or interests in "intangibles" created, by mistake.
If these suggestions as to the principle controlling relief for mistake are
at all sound, it seems to follow that relief for unilateral mistake should be
given subject to the same limitations which apply in case of mutual
mistake.
Moreover, it would seem to follow, also, that relief for mistake of fact
should be given no more readily than relief for mistake of law. It is per-
haps true that in many cases of mistake of law, the parties must be treated
as assuming the risk of mistake, according to the standard which has been
suggested. 3 On the other hand, this observation suggests caution in the
application of the principle, not a refusal to apply it to mistakes of law.
An interesting case of relief for unilateral mistake of law, which seems not
adequately explained by the court's suggestion of the taking advantage
of a known mistake, perhaps indicates the direction which Anglo-Ameri-
can courts will increasingly follow.' 4
Finally, the continental treatment of mistake suggests a reasonable
treatment of the problem of apportioning losses resulting from mistake.
If relief is allowed for unilateral mistake, a person seeking relief should not
be defeated because of a change of position, but should be required to com-
pensate the other party for any loss resulting from either faultless or negli-
gent mistake. Similarly, it seems in cases of mutual mistake relief should
not be denied because of change of position, but any loss should either be
shared equally or in proportion to any blame or responsibility which can
be attributed to either party. The result may, of course, be a denial of any
relief in a considerable number of the cases in which change of position
makes it impossible to apportion loss. In other cases, however, a develop-
ment of the rules governing relief for fraud may be useful in suggesting
rules for apportioning losses and determining the necessity for restitution
in cases of mistake.
- See the opinion of Lord Sumner in Jones v. Waring and Gillow, [1926] A.C. 670.
13 See 45 Harv. L. Rev. 336 (i93i).
'4 Peterson v. First Nat'l Bank of Ceylon, 162 Minn. 369, 203 N.W. 53 (1925). And see
Thayer, Unilateral Mistake and Unjust Enrichment as a Ground for the Avoidance of Legal
Transactions, Harvard Legal Essays, 467, 499 (i934).
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A number of minor points may require special consideration. It seems
that innocent misrepresentation should make it more difficult for a person
resisting relief to rely on assumption of risk by the other party; in this
respect, the German rule seems subject to improvement in the light of the
American decisions. The peculiar treatment of misunderstanding, or la-
tent dissent, resulting from the considerations controlling the decision of
Raffles v. Wichelhaus,s should perhaps be further considered, particularly
in its application to cases of unilateral misunderstanding. It is not indeed
apparent that those rare cases in which mistake prevents the existence of a
transaction at law, should be treated any differently from the cases in
which relief for mistake has either developed in equity or been influenced
by equitable principles applied by courts of law. Unilateral palpable mis-
take should receive special consideration. It would perhaps be relatively
easy to establish a similarity between mistake of expression and mistake
as to the legal consequences of words, the type of mistake of law for which
relief is most commonly granted in America.
Finally, it seems doubtful whether the rule that mistakes in writing can
be reformed only in equity and are therefore to be dealt with only by the
court and not the jury under a code, is justified by practical considera-
tions outweighing the resulting confusion in those jurisdictions where the
preservation of the distinction is not required by the interpretation of a
constitution. It should indeed be considered whether the rule, if it applies
to reformation, does not in principle equally apply to any relief for mis-
take in a transaction embodied in a writing.
Principles applicable to mistake are, as has often been observed, closely
comparable to the principles applicable to impossibility. It seems likely
that a consideration of mistake will prepare for the sound development of
greater liberality in granting relief for impossibility in the American
courts. In this development, it seems possible that American lawyers will
derive considerable help from recent experience in Germany.
III
Individual responsibility for voluntary undertakings and liability for
fault seem to be ideas which are capable of further development in the
rules governing consideration and mistake. The same ideas will perhaps
require further development in the treatment of negotiability and related
phenomena.
It is rather striking that the first important decision on the protection
of private rights afforded by the constitution dealt with the rights of a
1s 2 H. & C. 9o6 (1864).
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bona fide purchaser from a fraudulent grantee of land.,6 An exploration of
the reasons given by courts of equity for protecting bona fide purchasers
may throw some light on the general theory of negotiability. A notable
limitation on the protection given bona fide purchasers in equity results
from the application of the maxim that of two equities, the prior in time
prevails; and particularly from the application of this principle to rights
in choses in action. The limitation was questioned in a classic article. 7 An
application of the limitation was further examined more recently in a
study of rights in overdue negotiable instruments.,'
The common opinion is that recording acts do not create anything com-
parable to the negotiability of interests in real estate.' 9 Compare, how-
ever, the language in an opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes sustaining the
validity of a Torrens system against constitutional attack.20 And the ne-
gotiability of mortgage interests securing negotiable instruments is a
familiar phenomenon.
It seems possible that a primitive negotiability of chattel interests was
destroyed by a not very well considered development of the action of de-
tinue.2 It is striking that German ideas were displaced by Roman ideas
in English history; while on the continent, Roman ideas have been re-
placed by a limited negotiability of chattel interests. It seems not unlikely
that commercial necessities require a revival of something like some primi-
tive German ideas. The most familiar example of the pressure of com-
mercial necessity in this direction is the development of the Factors' Acts.
A tendency to extend the apparent authority of the bailee appears in the
paradoxical rule that while his possession does not of itself give him ap-
parent authority to sell, yet possession accompanied with authority to sell
on named terms gives effective power to sell on other terms, and possession
accompanied with authority to mortgage on named terms gives the power
effectively to mortgage on other terms.22 The rules governing the power
of a seller who retains possession and the seller who makes no delivery,
though based on theories of fraudulent transfer, seem to suggest the pos-
sibility of the emergence of a new general principle.2 3 The negotiability of
1 See the writer's Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 365
(,933).
X7 See Ames, Purchaser for Value without Notice, i Harv. L. Rev. I (1887).
's See Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 0io4 (igi8).
'g See Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 Mich. L. Rev. 405 (1924).
10 Eliason v. Wilborn, 281 U.S. 457 (1929).
"1See Waite, Caveat Emptor and the Judicial Process, 25 Col. L. Rev. 129 (1925).
"See 42 Harv. L. Rev. 685 (1929).
"3See Williston, Sales §§ 3o--325, 349-404 (2d ed. 1924).
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chattels by means of bills of lading is a more striking recent development
in the law.
Principles which may enlarge the power of one entrusted with posses-
sion to make a good title to a bona fide purchaser may be expected also to
enlarge the field of negotiable promises, and perhaps as well to facilitate
the negotiation of negotiable instruments by other means than the tra-
ditional commercial indorsement.24 A comparable development is to be
found in the case of some other instruments like insurance policies, which
are commonly associated in the business mind with the obligations which
they represent.25
The "objective" theory of contract seems to require a recognition of a
power in the possessor of a chattel, or an instrument associated in the com-
mercial mind with its obligation, greater than that which Anglo-American
courts have been disposed to recognize. Moreover, it has not been suffi-
ciently observed that the strict rules of conversion involve an application
of liability without fault which seems inconsistent with much of the rest
of our tort law.26 On consideration, it is perhaps less paradoxical than it
seems to suppose that the development of industry may require the exten-
sion of liability without fault in such cases as those dealt with by Rylands
v. Fletcher2 7 and in the fields of industrial and automobile accidents; while
at the same time the increasing complexity of commerce may require a
limitation of the liability or loss of a person who reasonably or merely in
good faith purchases chattel or contract rights from one who has been en-
trusted with the possession of what in ordinary life passes as evidence of
title.
A consideration of the tort question by itself might lead also to protec-
tion of a bona fide purchaser from a thief. Here, however, the policy con-
siderations seem more difficult to weigh, and the principles of contract
24 For an introduction to the extensive discussion of this question, see Sinykin, Extension of
the Concept of Negotiability, 8 Wis. L. Rev. 272 (1932). Compare the much criticized but
perhaps correct case of Marling v. Fitzgerald, 138 Wis. 93 (x9o9). An increasing recognition
that these principles are "normal" will perhaps help in determining the effect of some kinds
of "restrictive indorsements." Compare Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326,
175 N.W. 93 (1919). It may suggest further reconsideration of the effect of forged indorse-
ments in some situations. See Hudson and Feller, The International Unification of Laws
Concerning Bills of Exchange, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 333, 354-355, 360-361 (I93I).
2s See Campbell, Cases on Bills and Notes 58i (1928), note 3, for an introduction to the ref-
erences on this point.
26 Cf. Hollins v. Fowler, L.R. 7 H.L. 757 (x875). 27 L.R. 3 HL. 33 o (1868).
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offer no help. The purchaser from a bailee has been dealt with more favor-
ably than the purchaser from a thief, both in European law and in our own
law.2
8
IV
The fourth subject which seems ready for consideration is the subject
of specific performance. Here the influence of historical circumstances on
our law is again strong; though the practical importance of the resulting
situation should again not be exaggerated.
The influence of personalities in the development of the equitable prin-
ciples governing specific performance is in two or three instances rather
striking. The intemperance of Lord Chancellor Jefferies, which appears in
Lord Campbell's life of Jefferies, is exemplified in his first decision that
the taking of possession of land might take a land contract out of the Stat-
ute of Frauds.2 9 Here the scope of relief was broadened. On the other
hand, Professor Page has suggested that the limits on specific perform-
ance, based on the supposed difficulty of supervising affirmative conduct,
may have resulted from the easy-going habits of some English chancel-
lorsA0 In enforcing a trackage contract, Chief Justice Fuller once spoke
of "the intolerable travesty of justice involved in permitting parties to
refuse performance of their contracts at pleasure by electing to pay dam-
ages for their breach."' 3 Lord Justice Fry's enthusiasm for Aristotle,
Kant, and particularly Bishop Joseph Butler (see his "Sermons on Human
Nature") may possibly explain, though it does not warrant, his interest in
his rather abstract and formal doctrine of mutuality.32
These limits on the availability of specific performance are perhaps dis-
appearing. A more important limit which makes it impossible for a farmer
to secure the specific performance of a contract for the purchase of an or-
dinary herd of cattle, and for a city person to secure specific performance
of a contract for the purchase of stock without wasting time in argument
as to its uniqueness, remains.
It may be that the effort made in the Uniform Sales Act to liberalize the
availability of the remedy has met an obstacle in fear of the consequences
28 Compare Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 Harv. L. Rev. iio4 (i9i8). On this third
group of problems, see particularly Harvey, The Victims of Fraud (1932).
29 Butcher v. Stapley, i Vern. 363 (1685).
30 See 6 Page, Contracts § 3354 (2d ed. 1922).
31 Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Chicago Railway Co., 163 U.S. 564, 6oo (1896).
32 See Agnes Fry, Memoirs of Sir Edward Fry i58, i59 (921); F. C. Sharp, Ethics, 300-
302, 3o6-321 (1928).
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of the extended application of principles of equitable conversion to chattel
interests. 33 It may be that a party to a contract should be protected
against the sale of the subject-matter to any purchaser with notice.34 On
the other hand, the law of sales sufficiently covers the transfer of chattel
interests, and should not be complicated by ideas of equitable conversion
by contract. In particular, the interests of creditors who rely in good faith
on the state of legal title resulting from the ordinary rules of sales and
mortgages should not be endangered by the extension of the right to spe-
cific performance. A statute extending specific performance should be so
drafted as dearly to protect the interests under discussion.
33 Compare Bowman v. Adams, 45 Idaho 217, 261 Pac. 679 (927).
34 Compare Minnesota Marketing Assn. v. Radke, 163 Minn. 403, 204 N.W. 314 (1925);
Liberty Co. v. Burley Assn., 276 U.S. 71 (1928). Kelley v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co., ii F. Supp. 497 (N.Y. 1935), decided since this was written, illustrates the problems under
discussion.
